Abstract. Contactless technologies such as RFID, NFC, and sensor networks are vulnerable to mafia and distance frauds. Both frauds aim at passing an authentication protocol by cheating on the actual distance between the prover and the verifier. To cope these security issues, distancebounding protocols have been designed. However, none of the current proposals simultaneously resists to these two frauds without requiring additional memory and computation. The situation is even worse considering that just a few distance-bounding protocols are able to deal with the inherent background noise on the communication channels. This article introduces a noise-resilient distance-bounding protocol that resists to both mafia and distance frauds. The security of the protocol is analyzed with respect to these two frauds in both scenarios, namely noisy and noiseless channels. Analytical expressions for the adversary's success probabilities are provided, and are illustrated by experimental results. The analysis, performed in an already existing framework for fairness reasons, demonstrates the undeniable advantage of the introduced lightweight design over the previous proposals.
Introduction
A mafia fraud is a man-in-the-middle attack applied against an authentication protocol where the adversary simply relays the exchanges without neither manipulating nor understanding them [1] . The earliest version of this attack was introduced by Conway in 1976 and is known as the chess grandmaster problem [5] . In this problem, a little girl is able to compete with two chess grandmasters during a postal chess game, where she transparently relays the moves between the two grandmasters. She eventually wins a game or draws both.
In modern cryptography, mafia frauds can typically be used against authentication protocols. The adversary relays the messages between the prover and the verifier, who think they communicate together, while there is an adversary in the middle. This so-called mafia fraud was actually suggested by Desmedt, Bengio and Goutier in 1987 [6] to defeat the Fiat-Shamir protocol [8] .
One of the most promising field to apply the mafia fraud is the contactless technology, especially Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) and Near Field Communication (NFC) where the devices answer to any solicitation without explicit agreement of their holder. Some attacks have already been performed against both RFID and NFC systems [10, 12] . Nevertheless, mafia fraud is not limited to contactless technologies, it also threats other technologies such as smartcards [7] and e-voting [14] .
Two other attacks related to the mafia fraud exist: the terrorist fraud and the distance fraud. The distance fraud only involves a malicious prover, who cheats on his distance to the verifier. It was first introduced by Brands and Chaum [4] , and comes from the distance measuring process used to defeat the mafia fraud. The terrorist fraud is a variant of the mafia fraud where the prover is malicious and actively helps the adversary to succeed the attack [3] . No solution exists yet to avoid this exotic fraud, which is not addressed in this paper. Additional countermeasure must actually be considered to thwart this fraud.
As mentioned above, a distance measuring process can mitigate the mafia and distance frauds. To that aim, Brands and Chaum [4] proposed the distancebounding protocols (DB protocols). The distance estimation relies on the measurement of the Round-Trip-Time (RTT) of single bit exchanges. Considering the physical impossibility to travel faster than the speed of light, RTT bounds the distance between the parties. Several distance-bounding protocols have been proposed [1] . However, none of the current DB protocols are lightweight and resistance to both mafia and distance frauds. Furthermore, just a few of them are able to deal with the inherent background noise of the communication channel.
Contribution. In this paper we introduce a novel DB protocol that significantly reduces the success probability of an adversary capable of mounting both mafia and distance frauds. Our protocol does not rely on computationally expensive primitives, has a very low memory requirement, and is noise-resilient. Therefore, it is efficient and suitable for extremely low resources devices. We provide analytical and experimental results that together show the superiority of our proposal w.r.t. to previous ones.
Organization. Further below Section 2 presents a brief background about DB protocols. Section 3 explains the rationality behind our proposal and Section 4 introduces and details the proposal. Sections 5 and 6 are dedicated to the resistance of the protocol to mafia and distance frauds respectively. Section 7 describes our noise resiliency mechanism. Section 8 provides comparative results with several DB protocols in both scenarios the free-noise case and the noisy case. Finally, Section 9 draws the conclusions.
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n , which is the probability of a naive adversary who answers randomly to the n verifier challenges during the fast phase. However, this resistance is hard to attain for lightweight DB protocols. Therefore, our aim is to design a protocol that is close to this bound for both mafia and distance frauds, without requiring costly operations or an extra final slow phase. We also aim to reach the additional property of being noise-resilient. Below, the intuitions that lead to our design are explained for each of the three considered properties. Mafia fraud. Among the DB protocols without final slow phase, those achieving the best mafia fraud resistance are round-dependent [2, 13, 16] . The idea is that the correct answer at the ith round should depend on the ith challenge and also on the (i − 1) previous challenges. Our proposal also uses a round-dependent technique, the proposed construction is significantly simpler than those proposed in [2, 13, 16] , though. Distance fraud. As in mafia fraud, the best protocols in term of distance fraud are round-dependent. However, round-dependency by means of predefined challenges as in the Kim and Avoine's construction [13] fails to properly resist to distance fraud. Intuitively, as more control over the challenges the prover has, the lower the resistance to distance fraud is. For this reason, our proposal allows the verifier to have full and exclusive control over the challenges. Noise-resiliency. Round-dependent protocols can hardly work in noisy environments. A noise in a given round might affect all the subsequent rounds and thus, these rounds becomes useless from the security point of view. Therefore, in order to deal with noise, round-dependent protocols should be able to detect the noisy-rounds so that the prover responses can be checked considering these noise occurrences. To the best of our knowledge, our protocol is the first rounddependent DB protocol able to detect such a noisy-rounds with a high level of accuracy thanks to the simplicity of its design.
Proposal
This section describes the DB protocol introduced in the paper. Initialization, execution, and decision steps are presented below and a general view is provided in Figure 1 .
Initialization. The prover (P ) and the verifier (V ) agree on (a) a security parameter n, (b) a timing bound ∆t max , (c) a pseudo random function P RF that outputs 3n bits, (d) a secret key x.
Execution. The protocol consists of a slow phase and a fast phase.
Slow Phase. P (respectively V ) randomly picks a nonce N P (respectively N V ) and sends it to V (respectively P ). Afterwards, P and V compute P RF (x, N P , N V ) and divide the result into three n-bit registers Q, R 0 , and R 1 . Both P and V create the function f Q : S → {0, 1} where S is the set of all the bit-sequences of size at most n including the empty sequence. The function f Q is parameterized with the bit-sequence Q = q 1 . . . q n , and it outputs 0 when the input is the empty sequence. For every non-empty bit-sequence
Fast Phase. In each of the n rounds, V picks a random challenge c i ∈ R {0, 1}, starts a timer, and sends c i to P . Upon reception of c i , P replies with r i = R ci i ⊕ f Q (C i ) where C i = c 1 ...c i . Once V receives r i , he stops the timer and computes the round-trip-time ∆t i .
Decision. If ∆t i < ∆t max and r i = R ci i ⊕ f Q (C i ) ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} then the protocol succeeds 5 .
picks ci ∈R {0, 1} 
Resistance to mafia fraud
Analyses of DB protocols usually consider two strategies to evaluate the resistance against a mafia fraud: the pre-ask and the post-ask strategies [1] . Although considering these two strategies only do not provide a formal security proof, this evaluates the resistance of the protocol, at least against these well-known attack strategies, and is the only way known so far to evaluate DB protocols. Providing a formal security proof of DB protocols would be interesting but is clearly out of the scope of this paper.
This section reminds the concept of pre-ask strategy 6 , then identifies the adversarial behavior that maximizes the success probability when considering the pre-ask strategy, and the section finally computes this probability.
Best behavior
The pre-ask strategy consists first, for the adversary, to relays the initial slow phase. Then, she runs the fast phase with the prover. With the answers she obtains, she finally executes the fast phase with the verifier. In our case, we consider that the adversary first sends a sequence of challengesc 1 ...c n to the legitimate prover and receivesr 1 ...r n wherer i = Rc i i ⊕f Q (C i ) andC i =c 1 ...c i for every i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Next, she executes the fast phase with the verifier receiving the challenges c 1 ...c n . Givenr 1 ...r n , the adversarial behavior that maximizes the success probability is provided in Theorem 1. 
Proof. First, let us prove the following lemma. Lemma 1. Given that c i =c i , the adversary's behavior maximizing her success probability at the ith round is equivalent to the best behavior for guessing the
or the adversary losses this round.
In the case where c i =c i , the prover's responser i does not help the adversary since R ci i and Rc i i are independent values. Therefore, there does not exist any best behavior, i.e., whatever the adversary behavior, her success probability at this round is 1 2 . This result and Lemma 1 conclude the proof.
Adversary's success probability
Given the adversary's behavior provided by Theorem 1, Theorem 2 provides a recursive way to compute her success probability. Theorem 2. Let M i be the event that the adversary has won the first i rounds by following her best behavior with the pre-ask strategy. Let S i be the event that the adversary guesses f Q (C i ) ⊕ f Q (C i ) at the ith round. The probability Pr(M i ) can be recursively computed as follows:
Proof. If C i =C i , the adversary knows that f Q (C i ) ⊕ f Q (C i ) = 0 and thus, her success probability until the ith round is 1, which means that Pr(
can be expressed as follows:
Equation 1 states that the computation of Pr
Given that M i−1 depends on whether C i−1 =C i−1 or not, and considering that Pr(
can be transformed as follows:
Assuming that Pr(M i |C i =C i , M i−1 ) can be computed for every i, then according to Equations 2 and 3, Pr(M i |C i =C i ) can be recursively computed as follows:
Note that, the result Pr(M 1 |C 1 =C 1 ) = 1/2 can be used as the stopping condition for the recursion defined in Equation 4 . This recursion simplifies the analysis of Pr(M i ): instead of analyzing the probability to win all the i rounds, only the probability to win the ith round is needed. Since it depends on the adversary's behavior, and the latter depends on whether c i =c i or not, we compute Pr(M i |C i =C i , M i−1 ) as follows:
When c i =c i the adversary answers randomly and thus Pr(
Considering this result and that Pr(c i =c
From Equation 6 , we deduce that computing Pr
. Theorem 2 states that the adversary's behavior in this case is to guess
We now aim at computing Pr(
. Therefore, the adversary's strategy maximizing Pr(S i |C i−1 =C i−1 , M i−1 , c i =c i ) consists in holding her previous guess for the (i − 1)th round. So:
As pointed out by Equation 8 and Equation 7, computing Pr(M
. Since it is indexed by i − 1, we assume that Pr(M j ) is already computed for every j < i and as shown by Lemma 2,
can be recursively computed as follows:
where
2 is the stopping condition.
Proof. By definition of f Q (.), and because Pr(
Considering both results we obtain:
Finally, considering that Pr(
2 , the probability Pr(c i =c i |C i =C i , M i ) can be expressed as follows:
Equations 9 and 10 yield the expected result.
Lemma 2 together with Equations 1, 4, 6, 7, and 8, conclude the proof of this theorem.
Resistance to distance fraud
This section analyzes the adversary success probability when mounting a distance fraud. As stated in [1] , the common way to analyze the resistance to distance fraud is by considering the early-reply strategy instead of the pre-ask strategy. This strategy consists on sending the responses in advance, i.e., before receiving the challenges. Doing so, the adversary gains some time and might pass the timing constraint. In this section, the behavior that maximizes the success probability using the early-reply strategy is identified, and then a recursive way to compute the resistance w.r.t. a distance fraud is provided.
Best behavior
With the early-reply strategy, in order to send a response in advance in the ith round with probability of being correct greater that 1/2, the adversary must
) where C i−1 is the sequence of challenges sent by the verifier until the (i − 1)th round. Theorem 3 shows that, guessing the values f Q (C i ) for every i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1} is needed to maximize the adversary success probability.
Theorem 3. Let
Proof. In order to send a response in advance at the ith round with probability of being correct greater that 1/2, the adversary must send either R
As stated in Theorem 3, computing the adversary success probability requires the best behavior to guess the outputs sequence f Q (C 1 ), . . . , f Q (C n−1 ). Theorem 4 solves this problem. 
Proof. Assuming that q i = 0, then f Q (C i ) = f Q (C i−1 ) and thus, the probability to guess f Q (C i ) is equal to the probability of guessing f Q (C i−1 ). In the case of q i = 1, the adversary does not have a better behavior than choosing a random bit of challenge c i and considering that f Q (C i ) = f Q (C i−1 ) ⊕ c i . Given that f Q ( ) = 0 where is the empty sequence, the proof can be straightforwardly concluded by induction.
Adversary's success probability
Given the best adversary's behavior provided by Theorems 3 and 4, Theorem 5 shows a recursive way to compute the resistance to distance fraud. Theorem 5. Let D i be the event that the distance fraud adversary successfully passes the protocol until the ith round. Then, Pr(D i ) can be computed as follows:
where Pr(D 0 ) = 1 is the stopping condition.
Proof. Let F i be the event that the adversary correctly guesses the value of f Q (C i ). Then, the event D i depends on the events D i−1 and F i−1 , which can be expressed as follows:
Two cases occur (a) R 
Equation 12 
Four cases should be analyzed depending on the value of q i and the events F i and F i−1 .
Case 1 (q i = 1, F i and F i−1 hold). This case occurs if the adversary correctly guesses the challenge c i . Therefore, she provides the correct answer at this round R
Case 2 (q i = 1, F i andF i−1 hold). Given thatF i−1 and F i hold, the adversary computed f Q (C i ) = f Q (C i−1 ) ⊕c i using a challenge different from the verifier's one, i.e., c i =c i . Therefore, Pr(
Case 3 (q i = 0, F i and F i−1 hold). Given q i = 0, the event F i has no effect on the event
because it depends on whether R 
And Cases 2 and 4 yield this other result: 
Pr(
Considering that Pr(D 0 ) = 1, Equations 16 and 12 yield the expected result.
Noise resilience
Some efforts have been made in order to adapt existing distance-bounding protocols to noisy channels. Most of them rely on using a threshold x representing the maximum number of incorrect responses expected by the verifier [11, 13] . Intuitively, the larger x, the lower the false rejection ratio but also the lower the resistance to mafia and distance frauds. Others use an error correction code during an extra slow phase [17] . However, the latter cannot be applied to our protocol given that it does not contain any final slow phase. Consequently, we focus on the threshold technique.
Understanding the noise effect in our protocol
We consider in the analysis that a 1-bit challenge (on the forward channel) can be flipped due to noise with probability p f and a 1-bit answer (on the backward channel) can be flipped with probability p b . Further, we denote as c i the bit-challenge received by the prover at the ith round, which might be obviously different to the challenge c i . Similarly,r i denotes the response received by the verifier at the ith round. As in previous works [11] , the considered forward and backward channels are assumed to be memoryless. Table 1 shows the three different scenarios when considering a noisy communication at the i-th round in our protocol. According to the protocol, in a noise-free ith round executed with a legitimate prover it holds that r i =r i ⇔ f Q (C i ) = f Q (C i ). We thus say that prover and verifier are synchronized at the ith round if f Q (C i ) = f Q (C i ), otherwise they are said to be desynchronized. Intuitively, in a noise-free ith round the answerr i can be considered correct by the verifier either if r i =r i and they are synchronized or if r i =r i and they are desynchronized.
Forward Noise Backward Noise Forward and Backward Noise
The challenge is therefore to identify whether the prover and the verifier are synchronized or not. To that aim, we rise the following observation.
Observation 1 Several consecutive rounds where all, or almost all, the answers hold that r i =r i (resp. r i =r i ), might indicate that the legitimate prover and the verifier have been synchronized (resp. desynchronized).
Our noise resilient mechanism
Based on Observation 1, we propose an heuristic aimed at identifying those rounds where prover and verifier switch from being synchronized to desynchronized or vice versa. The heuristic is named SwitchedRounds and its pseudocode description is provided by Algorithm 1.
SwitchedRounds creates first the sequence d
The aim of these patterns is to look for large subsequences of either consecutive 0s or 1s in d 1 . . . d n . Note that, we do not include the patterns ∧(0+)1 and ∧(0+)$ because starting with a sequence of zeros is exactly what the verifier expects. Intuitively, the lower the expected noise the larger the subsequences should be. As an example, let us consider the case where the communication channel is noiseless. Since no noise is expected, the sequence d 1 . . . d n should be equal to n consecutive zeros unless an attack is being performed. In Algorithm 1, a threshold ∆l defines how large a matching d i ...d j should be in order to be analyzed. We discuss a computational approach to estimate a practical value for ∆l in Section 8.
If a pattern d i ...d j holds that j − i ≥ ∆l, SwitchedRounds looks for the closer index r to i + 1 such that q r = 1, and assumes that the rth round caused the switch from synchronization to desynchronization or vice versa. To understand this choice, let us note that a pattern
This could have happened if a switch from synchronization to desynchronization or vice versa occurred in the (i + 1)th round. However, due to the probabilistic nature of the noise we cannot precisely determine whether the switch occurred in the (i + 1)th round or in some (possibly close) round. What we do know is that such a round r must hold that q r = 1, which justifies Step 5 in Algorithm 1.
Once r is found, the pair (r, s) is created where s is 0 if the switch is to synchronization, s = 1 otherwise. Finally, SwitchedRounds recursively calls itself to analyze the two subsequences lying on the left and right side of d i ...d j . The output is the union of all obtained pairs such that they are in increasing order (according to the round) and every two consecutive pairs have different values (according to the type of switching).
Armed with the SwitchedRounds algorithm, the threshold technique can be straightforwardly applied as Algorithm 2 shows. It simply counts the number of errors occurred during the execution of the protocol where an error is defined as either a switched round or a wrong response. Both cases are considered as error because, on the one hand, a switched round might be falsely detected during an attack, and on the other hand, there is no distinction between a wrong response due to noise or to an attack. Finally, the protocol is considered to fail if the number of errors is above a threshold x.
Algorithm 1 SwitchedRounds
Require: The challenges c1...cn and the registers R 0 , R 1 , and Q. The prover's responsesr1...rn. A threshold ∆l indicating the minimum matching length. 1: Let d1...dn be a sequence such that di =ri ⊕ R Note that basing the decision on a threshold is a common and easy procedure but not the best one, especially when the channels are not memoryless. Instead, the decision procedure could consist in comparing the vector d 1 ...d n with the error distribution on the noisy channels.
Algorithm 2 Authentication in the presence of noise
Require: All the parameters of the protocol; an integer value x representing the noise tolerance; and a threshold ∆l. 1: Let E be the output of SwitchedRounds algorithm on input c1...cn,r1...rn, R 0 , R 1 , Q, and ∆l; 2: Let d1...dn be a sequence such that di =ri ⊕ R 
s ← s ; 8:
errors + +; 9:
else if (di = 0 and s = 1) or (di = 1 and s = 0) then 10:
errors + +; 11: if errors > x then return fail; 12: else return success;
Experiments and comparison
The first part of this section is devoted to compare several DB protocols in term of mafia fraud resistance, distance fraud resistance, and memory consumption. The second part takes noise into account and evaluates our proposal w.r.t. the Hancke and Kuhn's [11] and Kim and Avoine's [13] protocols.
Noise-free environment
Mafia and distance fraud analyses in a noise-free environment can be found in [11, 13, 16, 2] for KA2, AT, Poulidor, and HK. In the case of AT and Poulidor, only an upper-bound of their resistance to distance fraud have been provided [16, 9] . Considering those previous results, Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b) show the resistance to mafia and distance frauds respectively for the five considered protocols in a single chart. For each of them, the configuration that maximizes its security has been chosen: this is particularly important for AT and KA2 because different configurations can be used.
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show that AT and KA2 are the best protocols in terms of mafia fraud while our proposal is the best in terms of distance fraud. However, it makes sense to consider the two properties together. To do so, we follow the technique used in [16] to seek for a good trade-off. This technique first discretizes the mafia fraud (x) and distance fraud (y) success probabilities. For every pair (x, y), it then evaluates which protocol is the less round-consuming. This protocol is considered as the best for the considered pair. In case of draw between two protocols, the one that is the less memory-consuming is considered as the best protocol. Using this idea, it is possible to draw what we call a trade-off chart, which represents for every pair (x, y) the best protocol among the five considered (see Figure 3(a) ).
Figure 3(a) shows that our protocol offers a good trade-off between resistance to mafia fraud and resistance to distance fraud, especially when a high security level against distance fraud is expected. In other words, our protocol defeats all the other considered protocols, except when the expected security levels for mafia and distance fraud are unbalanced, which is meaningless in common scenarios.
Another interesting comparison could take into consideration the memory consumption of the protocols. Indeed, for n rounds of the fast phase, AT requires 2 n+1 − 1 bits of memory, which is prohibitive for most pervasive devices. We can therefore compare protocols that require a linear memory w.r.t. the number of rounds n. For that, we consider a variant of AT [2] , denoted AT-3, that uses n/3 trees of depth 3 instead of just one tree of depth n. By doing so, the memory consumption of all the considered protocols is below 5n bits of memory. The resulting trade-off chart (Figure 3(b) ) shows that constraining the memory consumption considerable reduces the area where AT is the best protocol, but it also shows that our protocol is also the best trade-off in this scenario.
Noisy environment
Among the protocols we are considering, only HK [11] and KA2 [13] claim to be noise resilient. For this reason, we analyze in this section the performance of our proposal in the presence of noise by comparing it with HK and KA2. The comparison is performed by considering two properties: availability and security. Availability is measured in terms of false rejection ratio and security in terms of mafia fraud resistance. It should be remarked that, distance fraud resistance (Figure 2(a) ) and distance fraud (Figure 2(b) ) success probabilities considering up to 64 rounds (logarithmic scale). The considered protocols are KA2 [13] , AT [2] , Poulidor [16] , HK [11] , and our protocol. . Figure 3(a) considers the protocols KA2 [13] , AT [2] , Poulidor [16] , HK [11] , and our proposal, while Figure 3(b) changes AT by its low-resource consuming variant AT-3.
all noise probability higher than 0.1. Actually, a high noise probability makes useless all the distance bounding protocols proposed up-to-date.
Armed with these settings, Figure 4 (a) and Figure 4(b) show the maximum resistance to mafia fraud for the three protocols considering the cases (a) and (b) respectively. Figure 4(a) shows the mafia fraud resistance of the three protocols when p f = p b . As expected, the higher the noise the lower the provided security of the three protocols. In this scenario, however, our protocol is clearly the best even though KA2 achieves the highest resistance when no noise is considered (p f = p b = 0).
A different scenario (p f + p b = 0.05) is shown by Figure 4(b) . There, the security of HK improves with p f , while KA2 and our protocol are clearly sensitive to the increase of p f . This is an inherent problem of both protocols since a noise in the forward channel could cause a "desynchronization" between the prover and the verifier. Nevertheless, thanks to the noise resilience mechanism proposed in Section 7.2, our protocol deals with noise much better than KA2 and, in general, performs better than both HK and KA2.
Conclusions
A new lightweight distance-bounding protocol has been introduced in this article. The protocol simultaneously deals with both mafia and distance frauds, without sacrificing memory or requiring additional computation. The analytical expressions and experimental results show that the new protocol outperforms the previous ones. This benefit is obtained through the use of dependent rounds in the fast phase. The protocol also goes a step further by dealing with the inherent background noise on the communication channels. This is a serious advantage compared to the other existing protocols. 
